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LORETTO HEIGHTS COLLEGE: A College
"Unlike Yeshiva"
INTRODUCTION
In March 1984, the Tenth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case
of Loretto Heights College v. NLRB. I The appellant, Loretto Heights Col-
lege, argued that, contrary to the decision of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB or Board), its faculty members were managerial
employees and, thus, were excluded from the protective coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act). 2 The NLRB argued to
uphold the Board's decision that the faculty members were not manag-
ers but employees, entitled to collective bargaining rights. 3 As an Inter-
venor, the Loretto Heights faculty, through its current bargaining agent,
the Faculty Education Association (FEA or Union), argued to uphold the
opinion of the Board.4 On September 4, 1984, the Tenth Circuit found
for the NLRB.
5
Loretto Heights has potential importance to the academic community.
It is the first appellate consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Yeshiva University,6 concerning the status of faculty members as
either employees or managers. 7 The Court could have reversed the
NLRB decision and held that Loretto Heights faculty were managers be-
cause they existed in an environment "like Yeshiva". 8 Instead the Court
affirmed the decision of the NLRB, largely out of deference to the
1. 742 F.2d 1245 (1984).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 etseq. (1982).
3. Loretto Heights College, 264 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1982). Pursuant to § 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the decision was made by a three-member panel.
29 U.S.C.§ 153(b) (1982).
4. The case originated with the filing of a complaint by the FEA alleging that Loretto
Heights College violated §§ 8(a)(l) and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5)
(1982). The College refused to negotiate a successor agreement. 264 N.L.R.B. at 1107.
5. 742 F.2d at 1246.
6. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
7. Managerial employees are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). Section 14(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(a) (1982), provides that employers need not recognize supervisors (defined in
§ 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982)) as members of a bargaining unit. The Court in Bell
defined "managerial employees" as those who "formulate and effectuate management pol-
icies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer." 416 U.S. at
288.
In Yeshiva, managerial employees are described as employees "who are involved in
developing and enforcing employer policy"; as employees who "must exercise discretion
within, or even independently of established employer policy and must be aligned with
management"; and as those who "represent management interests by taking or recom-
mending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy." 444
U.S. at 682-83.
8. The Supreme Court makes clear that its decision in Yeshiva applies not only to
Yeshiva University but to other universities "like Yeshiva". 444 U.S. at 688. How "alike"
the institution must be is the issue that has consumed considerable time and effort on the
part of attorneys for the universities and for the faculties.
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Board. Nevertheless, it did provide some indication of how the princi-
ples first laid down in Yeshiva would be applied.
This note will discuss the Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision and the
events leading up to that decision. It will also discuss the NLRB's analy-
ses and practices following that decision as reflected in its internal docu-
ments and its decisions. Finally, the note will discuss Loretto Heights, the
arguments and briefs presented to the Tenth Circuit, and the resulting
opinion and the lessons it contains.
I. NLRB AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION PRIOR TO YESHIVA
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Yeshiva, Congress never spe-
cifically addressed whether college or university faculties were eligible to
organize under the NLRA. 9 It was originally thought that Congress did
not have power over such faculties because they were employed by non-
profit institutions which did not affect interstate commerce.' 0 But in
1970, the Board asserted jurisdiction over private higher education.'' A
year later, the Board approved the formation of bargaining units com-
posed of faculty members, 12 reasoning that faculty members were pro-
fessionals and entitled to the coverage of the Act. They rejected the
position that faculty members were supervisors or managers.'
3
The assertion of jurisdiction did not, however, eliminate the prob-
lem of reconciling the industrial model (to which the NLRA was primar-
ily addressed) with the educational environment. The Board concluded
that:
[The] industrial model cannot be imposed blindly on the aca-
demic world as though there was a one-to-one relationship.
The basis interests recognized by the [National Labor Rela-
tions] Act remain the same, but their interrelationship . . .
does not squarely fit the industrial model. . . . Rarely, if ever,
does industry present a situation where employee interests
outside the economic sphere assume major importance. 14
The Board then sought to develop a model which would "serve all
the legitimate interests of employees"' 15 and would provide a structure
for assessing which faculty members were employees and which were
managers. The Board's model had four criteria:
1) Is the individual a "professional" within the section
9. 444 U.S. at 679.
10. Id. at 679-80 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504-05
(1979)). See also Sussman, University Governance Through a Rose-Colored Lens: NLRB v.
Yeshiva, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 30-31; Weiss, Yeshiva Revisited: The National Labor Relations
Board and Collective Bargaining at Private Universities, 10 W. ST. U.L.J. 23, 25-27 (1982).
11. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970) (non-academic employees).
12. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971).
13. Id. The Board continued with this approach up to the Supreme Court decision in
Yeshiva. See Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971); Adelphi University, 195
N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1975); Northeastern Univer-
sity, 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Fairleigh Dickinson University, 227 N.L.R.B. 239 (1976).
14. Syracuse University, 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973).
15. Id.
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152(12) definition? 16
2) To the extent that the employee exercises authority which
in other contexts might be considered managerial, does
she excercise that authority collectively with her peers
rather than individually?
3) Does the employee, in exerting that authority, act in her
own interests rather than that of management?
4) Are the employee's decisions subject to reversal by a
higher authority? 17
Affirmative answers indicated that an employee was an appropriate
member of a bargaining unit. Negative responses indicated that faculty
members were probably managers and thereby excluded from the Act.
II. NLRB V. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY
In 1974, the union at Yeshiva University filed a petition for certifica-
tion of a bargaining unit consisting of full-time faculty members. Op-
posing that petition, the University argued that its faculty were
managerial personnel and not employees within the meaning of the Act.
The Board determined that the Yeshiva faculty were not managerial em-
ployees and were entitled to have a bargaining unit certified.18
After the election and certification of the unit, the University re-
fused to bargain, again raising objections to the propriety of the NLRB's
unit determination. The NLRB found the University to be in violation
of the Act in refusing to bargain with the union and entered summary
judgment against the University, ordering it to bargain. The Board ap-
plied to the Second Circuit for enforcement of this order. 19
The Second Circuit determined that the Yeshiva faculty were, in
fact and law, managerial employees. The court found that the faculty
were "in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the enter-
16. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12) defines a professional employee as (a) any employee engaged
in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of dis-
cretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced
or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
(iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course of instruction and study in an institution of higher learn-
ing or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an appren-
tiveship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellec-
tual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and is performing re-
lated work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
17. Although both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court discussed the criteria
employed by the NLRB in determining whether a faculty's statutes was managerial or not,
582 F.2d at 697-702; 444 U.S. at 605, this particular description of the model employed by
the NLRB comes from Casey, Yeshiva University and the Definition of ",Managerial" 14 AKRON
L. REV. 591, 603 (1981). The development of those criteria have been traced in prior
articles. See Casenote, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 663 (1979); Recent Developments, 47 FORDHAM
L. REV. 437 (1978); Recent Developments, 13 GA. L. REV. 313 (1978).
18. This short description of events is found in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d
686, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1978). The Board's decision can be found at Yeshiva University, 221
N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975).
19. 582 F.2d at 689.
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prise. ' ' 20 The Court held that the record established that there was "no
significant divergence between the interests of the faculty and those of
the administration."
2 1
The union appealed the Second Circuit opinion to the Supreme
Court. 2 2 The Supreme Court addressed the factors which the NLRB
had established to determine faculty members' status under the
NLRA. 23 Since the University did not contend that its faculty were not
professionals, 24 the first part of the test was answered in the affirmative
by concession. The Supreme Court focused its inquiry on the remaining
three criteria. The court treated these criteria, as had the Second Cir-
cuit, none too charitably. 25 It dismissed the "collective authority" and
"subjection to higher authority" criteria as being "unsupportable" and
"flatly inconsistent with the Board's own precedents."
2 6
After chastising the Board for a conclusory decision and its failure
to make specific findings of fact as to the Yeshiva situation, 27 the Court
concluded (on its own theoretical rather than factual basis) that "the
faculty's professional interests-as applied to governance at a university
like Yeshiva-cannot be separated from those of the institution."'2 8
Later, the Court observed that this inseparability of interests was an "in-
evitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by universi-
ties like Yeshiva."
2 9
In so holding, the Court effectively refuted the one Board argument
it had considered worth raising. In elaborating on the inseparability of
interests concept, the Court held unjustified the Board's assumption
"that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the
institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member
could not simultaneously be aligned.'"30 The Court continued:
In [a university like Yeshiva], the predominant policy normally
is to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will
accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the limits
of its financial resources. The "business" of a university is edu-
cation, and its vitality ultimately must depend on academic poli-
cies that largely are formulated and generally are implemented
by faculty governance decisions. . . . Faculty members en-
hance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission
by ensuring that the university's objectives are met. But there
can be no doubt that the quest for academic excellence and in-
stitutional distinction is a "policy" to which the administration
20. Id. at 698.
21. Id. at 701.
22. 444 U.S. 672.
23. These are the criteria found supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24. 444 U.S. at 681. See also 582 F.2d at 697.
25. 444 U.S. at 683-85; 582 F.2d at 698-702.
26. 444 U.S. at 685 & n.22. These factors were abandoned by the Board in the Yeshiva
case before the Supreme Court. Id.
27. 444 U.S. at 678.
28. Id. at 688.
29. Id. at 689 n.28.
30. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
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expects the faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a profes-
sional or an institutional goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an
employee is "expected to conform" to one goal or another
when the two are essentially the same.
3 1
The Court does not say that the motivating interest of the faculty and
the institution are identical. Rather, it says that the ultimate interest (or
goal) of the faculty, and institution is inseparable: the formulation and
implementation of academic politics that strive to produce academic ex-
cellence and an institution of distinction. Given a structure like
Yeshiva's, where the policies are formulated and implemented by faculty
governance decisions, the interests of the faculty and administration are
"simultaneously aligned."3 2
It is clear that the alignment of interests that the Court was discuss-
ing were those primarily related to academic politics (the "product to be
produced" by the institution whose "business" is education). 33 In that
area, the authority of the Yeshiva faculty was absolute. They effectively
decided who would be the beneficiaries of those policies ("the custom-
ers to be served"). Finally, they played a "predominant role in faculty
hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion" ("the terms
upon which [the product would] be offered").3 4 Because their profes-
sional expertise in those matters was indispensable to the formulation
and implementation of academic policy, 3 5 the university required their
participation in governance. 36 This participation by faculties and con-
comitant reliance by university administrations "is an inevitable charac-
teristic of the governance structure adopted by universities like
Yeshiva."
'3 7
Thus, in order to determine if any given faculty is governed by
Yeshiva, a preliminary inquiry must be made into whether it has a gov-
ernance structure "like Yeshiva."'3 8 Such a structure would seem to re-
quire, as a minimum threshold, effective control over academic policy
and programs. If a governance structure produces or allows this, a
faculty will generally have other effective controls, beginning with their
own personnel decisions but varying considerably beyond that point.
Yeshiva might have been correctly decided given its structure, but
31. Id. (footnote omitted, citation omitted).
32. This is not to say that there are not occasional differences in interests. The Court
seems to accept without debate that "faculty interests depart from those of the institution
with respect to salary and benefits," id. at 688 n.27, but finds such divergence insufficient
to remove the Yeshiva faculty from its "managerial" status. Indeed, the Court felt that this
is true of every managerial employee and probably less true in the academic environment
than elsewhere because the "nature and quality of a university depend so heavily on the
faculty attracted to the institution." Id. n.27.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 686 & n.23.
35. Id. at 689.
36. Id.
37. Id. at n.28.
38. At least one court and one author claim that being "like Yeshiva" requires an
institution to be a "mature private university". See Stephens Institute v. NLRB, 620 F.2d
720, 727 (1980) and Weiss, Yeshiva Revisited, supra note 10, at 23 n.2.
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the post-Yeshiva cases are plagued by confusion as to the extent of its
authority. It is clear that if an institution is found where the faculty does
nothing more than "determine the content of their own courses, evalu-
ate their own students, and supervise their own research,"13 9 its faculty is
not managerial. But if the faculty has "absolute" control over academic
matters (the product), and "effective control" over retention-but not
admission or tuition-of students (the customer), and a "predominant
role" over hiring but not sabbaticals (the terms upon which the product
will be offered), does it have managerial authority?
III. NLRB POSITION AFrER YESHIVA
Yeshiva clearly dismantled the Board's prior attempt to formulate
serviceable criteria for unit determination in higher education. What it
left in its place was pandemonium. Into the breach stepped the NLRB
General Counsel. In 1981, the General Counsel issued a memorandum
providing "Guidelines for Cases Arising Under Yeshiva". 40 He based
his analysis of faculty status after Yeshiva on a four-part test: First, did
faculty members "formulate, determine, or effectuate decisions of a
managerial character;" ' 4 1 second, even if such authority was exercised,
did "they do so in their own interest, rather than in the interest of the
employer; ' 4 2 third, even if they exercised managerial authority, to what
extent was the faculty "held 'accountable' from departures from institu-
tional policy"; 43 finally, the amount of time faculty invested in manage-
rial activities should be viewed to determine whether the conduct was
merely incidental to their "primary functions of teaching, research, and
writing."
44
To effectuate this test, the General Counsel further divided the in-
vestigation into four additional factors. 4 5 Only three of these four fac-
tors will be discussed here.46 The first factor involved "faculty
participation in decisionmaking". The Memorandum listed eighteen ar-
eas where Yeshiva found the faculty had made final decisions and effective
recommendations. 4 7 These were followed by nine "other areas in which
39. 444 U.S. at 690 n.31.
40. NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 81-19, Guidelines for Cases Arising Under
NLRB v. Yeshiva University (April 10, 1981) reprinted in 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 304
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. Additional discussion regarding this Memorandum
can be found in Sheppard and Moran, The Future of Faculty Collective Bargaining at Private
Universities, 9 J.C.U.L. 41, 44-46 (1982-83).
41. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 307.
42. Id. This is reminiscent of one of the pre-Yeshiva criterion. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text. This consideration leads to an analysis of whether there is a diver-
gence of interests between faculty and administration.
43. Id. at 307.
44. Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. The difficulty of the task is probably subliminally evidenced by the fact that the
sections purport to be alphabetically divided from "A" to "E". Due either to the nature of
the task or to a later restructuring of the material, there are finally only four sections,
section D appearing not at all.
46. The fourth factor discusses "Supervisory Status". Because the Supreme Court
did not rule on this question in Yeshiva, that section is not discussed.
47. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 307 (footnote omitted). The areas listed were:
[Vol. 62:2
LORETTO HEIGHTS
the faculty's authority and influence should be considered."'48 The Gen-
eral Counsel cautioned that this list of twenty-seven factors was not
meant to be exhaustive.4 9 The Memorandum did not indicate what, if
any, relative weights these areas had in making a managerial versus em-
ployee determination. 50
The second factor asked, "[d]o faculty members act in the interest
of the employer?" 5 ' - In this section, the General Counsel began by not-
ing that "at Yeshiva, the professional interests of the faculty could not
be separated from those of the University. On the other hand, the Court
did not foreclose the possibility of a contrary conclusion on the basis of
a different structure and a different record."'5 2 The General Counsel
then described the faculty structure at Yeshiva as one where the "univer-
sity was compelled to rely on the faculty [because] it had no one else to
rely on." 5 3 He suggested that the Board look at a university's structure
to see whether there were administrators with the power to make the
decisions that were within the "absolute control" of the Yeshiva faculty.
He noted that "[a]t Yeshiva there [was] no substantial intermediate level
of administrators upon whom the Trustees and President [could] rely to
make informed decisions as to matters left to the faculty."
54
Thus, the Counsel contended that it was an absence of middle man-
agement that put the Yeshiva faculty in the position of having to make
management decisions and put the administration in a position where it
was required to rely on them. He saw the Yeshiva faculty stepping into
an academic-line organization vacuum. Therefore, where layers of ad-
ministration were present between the faculty and the President, 55 there
(1) curriculum (course content and course schedules, (2) teaching methods,
(3) grading policies, (4) matriculation standards, (5) admission policies, (6) reten-
tion policies, (7) graduation policies, (8) size of student body, (9) tuition, (10) lo-
cation of the school, (11) teaching loads, (12) student absence policies,
(13) enrollment levels, (14) faculty hiring, (15) tenure, (16) sabbaticals, (17) ter-
minations, and (18) promotions.
Id.
48. Id. at 307-08 (footnote omitted). The areas listed were: "(1) salaries, (2) budget,
(3) faculty evaluations, (4) faculty grievances, (5) research projects, (6) scholarships,
(7) honorary degrees, (8) leaves of absence, and (9) selection and/or evaluation of
chairpersons." Id.
49. Id. at 308 n.3.
50. Issues involving size of student body, tuition, location of school, student absence
policies, enrollment levels, and honorary degrees should have little, if any, weight. If a
faculty finds itself at a "selective college", it may well have something to say about student
admissions, size of student body, and tuition. If, on the other hand, the faculty is at a
"non-selective" institution, that policy is foregone. Implementation of managerial policies
are still required in the academic and personnel areas, however. This involvement would
be sufficient to find a faculty managerial under Yeshiva. The NLRB seems to have accepted
this analysis because it has stated that it does not consider "faculty involvement or lack of
[it] in these areas as vitally significant." Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 580, 581 n.34 (1982).
This case is discussed infra note 68 and accompanying text.
51. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 309.
52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 308 n.24, 310.
54. Id. at 306 n.10.
55. Id. at 309. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Loretto Heights accepted this
middle-management buffer theory. Loretto Heights College and Loretto Heights Col-
lege/Faculty Education Association, Case No. 27-CA-6667,JD-(SF)-I59-81 at 31 (June 8,
19851
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was no vacuum to be filled.
The Supreme Court, however, never spoke of any "compulsion" by
the Yeshiva administration in the reliance on its faculty. It did say that:
The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a uni-
versity like Yeshiva, which depends on the professional judgment of its
faculty to formulate and apply crucial policies constrained only
by necessarily general institutional goals. The university re-
quires faculty participation in governance because professional
expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementa-
tion of academic policy.
56
The Supreme Court pointed out that the business of the university
was education and those persons who knew the most about the product
were the faculty members. Their participation in the formulation and
implementation of academic policies was necessary to produce the best
product. They were, in essence, the middle managers. Even where
there are layers of administration through which the faculty's formula-
tions and the administration's implementations are filtered, if the formu-
lations are almost always implemented, there exists a structure like
Yeshiva.
The third factor to be considered, according to the General Coun-
sel, was accountability. He advised that after Yeshiva it was important:
to ascertain whether faculty members are held accountable by
higher authority for their academic decisions and personnel
recommendations, or whether they are held accountable only
for their performance in the areas of teaching, research, and
publishing. A lack of accountability for what typically are man-
agerial functions would tend to indicate employee status. 5
7
Neither the Court in Yeshiva, nor the General Counsel, ever explained
what the test of accountability for academic or personnel decisions
should be.
IV. THE BOARD'S POST-YESHIVA DECISIONS
After the Yeshiva decision, the boards of directors of many institu-
tions sought to hitch their wagons to Yeshiva's star,58 and it was with
great anticipation that they and faculty unions looked to see what course
the NLRB would steer in its wake. Their wait ended in May, 1982, when
the Board announced five decisions. In three-Ithaca College, 59 Thiel Col-
lege60 and Duquesne University6 ' the faculty's authority rendered them
1981) [hereinafter cited as ALJ Op.]. The Tenth Circuit, likewise, accepted this analysis as
sound. 742 F.2d at 1254.
56. 444 U.S. at 689 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
57. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 310 (footnote omitted).
58. The 1981 Labor Relations Yearbook lists five institutions which refused to bargain
initial contracts with certified unions and eleven institutions which refused to bargain
agreements upon the expiration of the initial ones. It is stated that "27 institutions have
exercised some type of Yeshiva claim." 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 10-11.
59. 261 N.L.R.B. 577 (1982).
60. 261 N.L.R.B. 581 (1982).
61. 261 N.L.R.B. 587 (1982).
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managerial. Two others-Bradford Coleg62 and Montefiore Hospital and
Medical Center 6 3-had non-managerial faculties.64
All of the above cases were the result of challenges to initial unit
certification and administrators' decisions not to bargain initial contracts
based on their reading of Yeshiva. For example, the facts in Bradford
revealed that while existing school policies gave faculty the right to make
recommendations with regard to curriculum, admissions, tuition and
faculty salaries, the record showed that such recommendations were
often ignored by the President or Dean.6 5 It became apparent that the
Board would look at the constitution and bylaws of an institution and
would compare that "paper" to the actual practices in place. Where pa-
per and practice differed, the Board found the practice determinative.
66
The law school faculty at Duquesne, on the other hand, was deemed to
have managerial authority nearly identical to that possessed by the
Yeshiva faculty in critical academic matters such as curriculum, grading,
admission and matriculation standards. It also exercised authority in
nonacademic matters, including decisions regarding hiring and
tenure.
6 7
In terms of charting the Board's post-Yeshiva course, the most use-
ful indication came in a footnote in the Thiel College case:
There is no specific evidence concerning whether the Thiel
College teachers are involved in decisions regarding academic
calendars, student absence policies, enrollment levels, tuition,
and the location of a school . . . . [T]he faculties of only some
of the 10 schools of Yeshiva . . . effectively determined ques-
tions in these areas . . . . [W]e do not regard faculty involve-
ment or lack of involvement in these areas as vitally
significant.
6 8
The Board's indication that these areas were peripheral to its view of
Yeshiva provided some hope that more central areas were beginning to
emerge.
While Board harmony characterized the first set of decisions, when
the Board turned to cases where institutions had invoked Yeshiva in re-
fusing to bargain new agreements upon the expiration of the old ones,
6 9
that harmony quickly dissolved. Since Loretto Heights falls into this latter
category, these cases decided in 1982 will be examined more
thoroughly.
62. 261 N.L.R.B. 565 (1982).
63. 261 N.L.R.B. 569 (1982).
64. The cases cited in notes 59-63, supra, are discussed in Weiss, Yeshiva Revisited,
supra note 10, at 34-37.
65. 261 N.L.R.B. at 566-67.
66. Id. See also New York Medical College, 263 N.L.R.B. 124 (1982).
67. 261 N.L.R.B. at 589.
68. 261 N.L.R.B. at 581 n.34.
69. In so doing, the management of these institutions were arguably in violation of
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1982), which makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with duly certified representatives.
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
In Florida Memorial College,70 the faculty was found to be
nonmanagerial in a full Board decision, with Chairman Van De Water
and Member Hunter dissenting. The majority found that the Florida
Memorial faculty committees were granted little authority, did not meet
regularly, were not comprised solely of faculty members, and were not
fully staffed. 7 1 The Board also found that the curriculum was not within
the faculty's absolute control, because the committee controlling course
offerings had administrators numbering about one half of its voting
membership. 7 2 Nor was there any real faculty authority with regard to
personnel matters such as hiring, tenure, promotions, grievances or
sabbaticals.
73
The dissenters argued that the faculty was managerial because they
determined teaching methods, course content and scheduling, student
evaluations, and the assignment of instructors to specific courses. 7 4 The
dissent claimed that the record showed extensive faculty participation in
virtually every aspect of the College's life. 7 5 In reading the record, the
majority deemed the faculty involvement as mere consultation, while the
dissenters saw it as effective recommendation.
7 6
In College of Osteopathic Medicine,7 7 the Florida Memorial dissenters,
Van De Water and Hunter, were members of a three member panel of
the Board which decided that the faculty there had "almost plenary au-
thority in academic matters and significant input into important nonaca-
demic matters." 78 The specifics cited in the decision include faculty
participation in the formulation of the basic academic philosophies and
polices of the College, the setting of admission policies, and the exercise
of considerable influence in faculty hiring.79 In addition, where faculty
did not have ultimate authority, the evidence revealed heavy administra-
tive reliance on faculty committee recommendations.8"
A notable aspect of this case was the union's contention that if the
faculty did have managerial authority, that authority was the direct result
of gains made through collective bargaining and that the unit should be
unable to "bargain itself out of the protections of the Act." 8' That posi-
70. 263 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1982).
71. Id. at 1252.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1254.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1255.
77. 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
78. Id. at 297.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The opinion indicates that this argument had also been made in Ithaca Col-
lege, supra note 59. The argument was also made in Farleigh Dickinson University, 227
N.L.R.B. 239 (1976), but the Board did nct address the issue. Counsel for the NLRB
General Counsel endorses this opinion. See Brief to the Administrative Law Judge on
Behalf of Counsel for the General Counsel at 24-26 and Answering Brief to the Board on
Behalf of Counsel for the General Counsel at 13-16 (Case No. 27-CA-6667). The ALJ
found that the Loretto faculty was non-managerial even with the authority it had secured
under the collective bargaining agreement. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 29. Postured in this
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tion was rejected. Since the Yeshiva decision did not distinguish situa-
tions in which managerial authority was gained through collective
bargaining from situations in which such authority was more freely
granted, such a distinction was not found to be warranted by the Act.
82
The Board's decision that what must be determined in deciding
whether or not an institution is "like Yeshiva" is the extent of manage-
rial authority held by college faculties, regardless of how obtained,
8 3
coupled with the uncertain guidelines presented in Yeshiva, sounds an
ominous chord for faculty members whose units have gone unchal-
lenged, or even, as in Loretto Heights, where the unit has survived a chal-
lenge. Faculty unions may, out of a sense of self-preservation, seek to
preserve the non-managerial status quo and may thwart any creative at-
tempts at campus problem solving which may insinuate managerial
authority.
84
The extent of uncertainty that the Yeshiva Board holdings and col-
lective bargaining agreements formented is perhaps most evident in
Lewis University.85 There, in another three-to-two decision, the Board
found the faculty non-managerial. The majority's decision rests heavily
on the "master contract", the agreement which had been bargained for
in 1975, and cites in full the "management rights" provision of that con-
tract. The Board concluded that the limited authority granted to the
faculty in the master contract clearly demonstrated that they were not
intended to perform managerial functions or be considered managerial
employees. 8 6 To exemplify that limited authority, the majority noted
that unlike the faculty members at Yeshiva, the Lewis faculty did not
decide grading policies, matriculation standards, academic calendars, or
which students would be admitted, retained, or graduated. 8 7 Lewis'
faculty also did not determine the size of the student body, the tuition,
or the location of the school.
8 8
In dissent, Chairman Van De Water and Member Hunter were of
the opinion that the faculty members were managerial.8 9 The Board's
inability to agree on how Yeshiva should apply prompted separate
lengthy dissents best characterized by Member Hunter's statement that
way, the Tenth Circuit had no reason to address this matter as a discrete question of
authority.
82. 265 N.L.R.B. at 298.
83. Id.
84. For instance, at Loretto Heights, while awaiting the Tenth Circuit decision, union
members felt compelled to seek the advise of the union attorney as to whether any of its
members could serve on a special Presidential Committee on Long-Range Goals. Later,
even after the union had survived the court challenge, members expressed concern that a
proposed change in the faculty curriculum committee structure might run afoul of the
managerial exclusion. This information is known to the author first-hand as a faculty
member of Loretto Heights and a member of the Union Executive Committee.
85. 265 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1982).
86. d. at 1249.
87. Id.
88. Id. These are the very areas that the Board had announced in Thiel College as not
being "vitally significant". See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
89. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1252.
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an "examination of [the Chairman's] dissent as contrasted with the ma-
jority's decision might well cause one to question whether the Chairman
and the majority read the same record." 90 Member Hunter attempted to
provide some analytical basis for the differences of opinion. Where the
dissenters saw managerial authority, the majority saw either
"(a) authority with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining embod-
ied in the parties' master contract, (b) mere exercise of professional
judgment, or (c) authority only to make nonbinding recommenda-
tions." 9 ' As to the first, Hunter repeated his position, first stated in Os-
teopathic Hospital,9 2 that the source of authority is irrelevant under both
the NLRA and Yeshiva. As to the second and third factors, Hunter felt
that the record, even as described by the majority, supported a finding
of managerial authority (rather than professional judgment) and effec-
tive (rather than nonbinding) recommendations.
9 3
V. NLRB AND LORETTO HEIGHTS COLLEGE
Loretto Heights College was one of the first institutions to follow
the Yeshiva banner. Loretto Heights faculty first certified its union on
September 21, 1972. 9 4 Nine days after Yeshiva was announced, the Col-
lege President informed the President of the faculty union (Faculty Edu-
cation Association or FEA) that as a result of Yeshiva some question had
been raised about whether the College should continue to negotiate
with the Union. After further correspondence, the College refused to
negotiate.9 5
An unfair labor practice charge was filed by the FEA on April 4,
1980 alleging violations of the NLRA. 96 On June 8, 1981, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) found against the College, stating that the
faculty were not managers but employees entitled to the protections of
the Act, and the College was required to bargain with them.
9 7
Both sides filed exceptions to the ALJ decision, and the matter was
90. Id. Compare, for instance, the majority's statements discussed in the text with the
Chairman's conclusion that the faculty "determines student admission requirements, what
programs shall be offered, and what degree will be awarded to whom. It decides grading
standards and graduation requirements. The faculty convened determines, in conjunction
with their department chairpersons, what courses shall be offered, to whom, and at what
time. The record reveals that the faculty . .. through the various standing committees
. . . has extensive authority to formulate and effectuate academic policies for the Univer-
sity." Id. at 1251.
91. Id. at 1252.
92. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
93. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1253-54.
94. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 5.
95. Id. at 6-7. "When the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, 90 private colleges
and universities were engaged in collective bargaining. Today, 58 private four-year col-
leges and 11 private two-year colleges bargain. While some unions have disbanded ...
many have been decertified because of the Yeshiva decision .... A total of about 50
'Yeshiva claims' have been filed with the labor board. . . . About 20 have been settled by
board decisions, while another 10 have been withdrawn, settled in other ways, or
dropped." The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 6, 1984 at 20, col. 4-5.
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 32-34.
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considered by the NLRB on the record without oral argument. 9 8 The
Board substantially adopted the ALJ's decision, 9 9 and the College filed
an appeal. Because the Board had adopted the ALJ's decision, the argu-
ments in the Tenth Circuit centered around the accuracy of that
decision.
The ALJ found that the union movement began at Loretto in 1971
primarily because faculty members were dissatisfied with the way the
College was being administered. They felt that their participation in
college governance had eroded from their earlier participation. °0 0 The
faculty had, however, achieved increased participation in governance
through its union.' 0 '
In analyzing the degree of faculty participation in college govern-
ance both before and after collective bargaining the ALJ found that:
The faculty did not run the university as the Yeshiva faculty did,
and the interests of the faculty were not at one with the inter-
ests of the University. . . . The faculty had nothing to do with
the admission or expulsion of students, establishment of tui-
tion, student financial aid, execution of contracts or leases of
property, or any other business or purely administrative func-
tions of [the College]. Final authority in every facet of [college]
governance rested with [the College]. It could not be stated
• . . that . . . [the] faculty was in a position wherein 'their au-
thority in academic matters is absolute.' ",102
Although finding some change in faculty status attendant to collective
bargaining under the union contract, the ALJ did not feel that the Col-
lege had demonstrated that the interests of the union and the College
were "now one and the same."'
0 3
The ALJ then analyzed whether faculty participation in governance
through organizations and committees was managerial in nature, or
whether such organizational participation was carried out by the faculty
as professionals applying their expertise to their daily work.' 0 4 Some
committees were found to be of a minor nature, even though the results
might affect the college in a substantial manner. Those committees in-
volved faculty personnel matters (sabbaticals, tenure, rank, faculty re-
view) and do not, in fact, seem minor either by nature or by Yeshiva
standards. By minor, the ALJ meant that the participation on those
committees did not take much faculty members' time. Service in this
part of faculty governance, therefore, was only incidental to the teach-
98. Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245
(1984).
99. 264 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1982).
100. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 5. This finding is in accord with the general position of
the dissent in Yeshiva which cited a Carnegie Commission Study for the proposition that
"[ulnionization for faculty is more ... an effort to preserve the status quo than to achieve
a new position of influence and affluence." 446 U.S. at 704 n.1 7.
101. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 5.
102. Id. at 28-29.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 30.
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ers' primary research, writing, and instruction duties. 10 5
Other committees were found to have more weight, 10 6 due to the
presence of administrators on the committees. Ironically, that very pres-
ence was held to so dilute the committee's work that it could not be
considered managerial. v0 7 Although some of the faculty participation
on committees was of a policy-making nature, it was found to be essen-
tially advisory. 10 8 The ALJ concluded that ultimate control remained
with the College.109
The ALJ's third reason for finding the Loretto Heights faculty non-
managerial drew upon the size of the administrative staff. In Yeshiva, the
staff was "small, and there was no effective buffer between the faculty
and top management . . . . [T]he university was compelled to rely upon
the faculty for advice, recommendations, establishment of policies, and
implementation of policies."'"'1 In contrast, Loretto's Program Direc-
tors were found to provide "a very effective buffer between top manage-
ment and the lowest echelon" with their decisions carrying greater
weight than those of faculty members." '1 Also, the Academic Dean's of-
fice was a "powerful one" and he, rather than the faculty, was the mana-
gerial authority in academic matters.' 12
A. Arguments Before the Tenth Circuit
Since the Board substantially adopted the ALJ's findings that the
Loretto Heights faculty were non-managerial, the College, to prevail at
the Tenth Circuit, had to demonstrate that the Loretto Heights faculty
represented "management interests by taking or recommending discre-
tionary actions that effectively control or implement employer pol-
icy."' 13 The central issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was the
degree of authority that a faculty must possess in order to be considered
managerial. The Yeshiva Court had clearly rejected a requirement that a
faculty possess absolute or final authority and stressed that the "relevant
consideration is effective recommendation or control"."14 The Board
itself has affirmatively acknowledged that this is the controlling
105. Id. The focus on time spent on governance matters as an indicator of managerial
or employee status has its genesis, in part, in the General Counsel's Memorandum. See
Memorandum, supra note 40, at 307 n.18, 309 n.33.
106. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 30.
107. Id. For another Board decision where the faculty committees were heavily popu-
lated with administrators (department chairman stipulated to be managerial and/or super-
visory), see New York Medical College, 263 N.L.R.B. 124 (1982) (faculty found non-
managerial).
108. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 31.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, the ALJ accepted the "administrative vacuum"
analysis presented by the NLRB General Counsel. A discussion of this "layer of adminis-
tration" theory can be found supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
111. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 31.
112. Id. at 31-32.
113. 444 U.S. at 683 (footnote omitted).
114. Id. at 683 n.17, 685 n.21.
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standard. ' 15
The College argued that the ALJ had ignored the record, which es-
tablished effective faculty control, as he was unable to cite to a single
instance where the faculty recommendations were rejected by the ad-
ministration.'16 The NLRB argued, inferentially, that this lack of rejec-
tion was the result of a committee structure so diluted by administrators
that the faculty's role was merely advisory.' 17
After weighing these arguments, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
while faculty members at Loretto Heights played a substantial role in
college governance, in most aspects of that governance their authority
was severely circumscribed and did not rise to the level of the "effective
recommendation and control" contemplated in Yeshiva.
18
The Court reasoned that the faculty played little if any role outside
the academic sphere.' 9 Their role was virtually nonexistent in business
affairs, as well as in admission, retention, and expulsion of students.
120
However, the Court deemed these matters of only limited signifi-
cance. 12 1 What was important to the Court was the faculty's role in aca-
demic affairs. 12 2  In that area, the Court found Loretto Heights'
committee structure pivotal. The mere existence of such a structure
made Loretto Heights "[u]nlike Yeshiva, where each school's faculty ap-
parently met and decided most academic matters as a collective
body[.]"' 23 Dissected, the committee structure revealed "minor" and
more weighty" committees. A committee was minor if it either (1) met
infrequently or (2) had little impact on College governance.
12 4
The Court's bifurcation may prove significant for other college
structures. While the assessment of a faculty committee's impact has an
obvious place in a managerial/non-managerial classification, it is easy to
see how such a measure could be at odds with frequency of meetings,
the measure proposed by the Court to indicate whether "faculty involve-
ment in the committees' work is so limited as to be 'only incidental to, or
in addition to, their primary functions of teaching, research and writing,'
rather than truly managerial in nature."1 2 5 A committee with significant
impact which works efficiently and, therefore, needs to meet only infre-
quently may "measure up" to a committee with precious little to do
which spends inordinate amounts of faculty time doing it. For faculty
members intent on preserving their union's status, the message might
be: meet frequently and for long periods of time.
115. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
116. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 98, at 20.
117. Respondent's Brief at 48, Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245
(1984).
118. 742 F.2d at 1245.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1252-53.
125. Id. at 1253.
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
When the Court considered those organizations that carry more
weight in the College's academic structure, it found that the faculty
power was more theoretical than actual.' 2 6 The Court supported this
contention in two ways: (1) the committees had only a recommending
or advising function; and (2) the presence of administrators on commit-
tees and the "layers of administrative approval required for many deci-
sions" seriously diluted any raw faculty power.
127
The first factor has been seen before, and it rises again like Ban-
quo's ghost. Those who would exercise it, like Hunter and Van De
Water (and Loretto Heights' attorneys) invoke Yeshiva's footnote that the
relevant consideration in any Yeshiva analysis is "effective recommenda-
tion or control" rather than final authority. 12 8 So, their exorcism pro-
ceeds, if the College administration accepts faculty recommendations an
overwhelming majority of the time, these faculty recommendations be-
come, in fact and in law, "effective and controlling". This position has a
certain appeal: it is logical, seems consistent with Yeshiva, and lends it-
self to numerical analysis.
Perhaps to counter this appeal, the Tenth Circuit seems to more
heartily rely on its second factor, the presence of administrators on the
major committees, to reinforce its position. The Court classifies the ad-
ministrators' presence in three ways: (1) physical presence on critical
committees, at times resulting in administrators' numerical superiority;
(2) presence in terms of administrative layering, i.e., administrators
holding critical positions in college governance; and (3) the presence of
Program Directors both on committees and as liasons between upper
management and faculty. 12 9 Of course, these three criteria need not be
distinct, a single Program Director could on any given day maintain all
three presences.
An analysis of this omnipresent management postulate reveals that
the net effect of the first two factors, numerical superiority on critical
committees and layering of administration, so comingles managerial in-
fluence with faculty judgment that the final recommendations are not
truly faculty recommendations at all. This is especially true where the
administration either has an independent vote or the power to hand a
recommendation "down" to the faculty committee which, in turn, sends
a recommendation "up" to the administration. If the faculty commit-
tee's recommendation never differs from that which came "down" to it,
it can easily be described as a situation where the faculty never differs
from the administrative recommendation, rather than the reverse.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1253-54.
128. 444 U.S. at 683 n.17.
129. 742 F.2d at 1254. In Loretto Heights, the Program Directors were stipulated to be
outside of the bargaining unit. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 7. To the extent that it is possi-
ble to compare Program Directors with Department or Division Chairmen, it is unusual
that such "middle managers" are outside the bargaining unit (see New York Medical Col-
lege, 263 N.L.R.B. 124 (1982)), but not unusual that an employer claims that they should
be. See Bradford College, 261 N.L.R.B. 565 (1982); Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 581
(1982).
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Therefore, the number of times that faculty recommendations are
adopted or rejected is no real indication of faculty authority.
The third presence, that of Program Directors, is dealt with most
elaborately. The "buffer" theory the court induces from their presence
may be the most significant element in the Loretto Heights decision.'
3 0
This is what seems to lead the Court to distinguish Loretto Heights from
Yeshiva. Initially, the theory is conceived by a comparison of the relative
size of the administrative staff at Yeshiva and Loretto Heights. At
Yeshiva, the administrative staff was considered fairly small in relation to
the university's size. 13 1 Consequently, said the Tenth Circuit, Yeshiva
was "in effect, 'compelled to rely on the faculty for advice, recommenda-
tions, establishment of polices and implementation of policies' .... As
a result, the Yeshiva faculty was by necessity 'aligned with manage-
ment.' ",132 In essence, the Court concluded, Yeshiva's faculty were
aligned with management because management needed them to be. By
contrast, Loretto Heights' administration was found to be large in rela-
tion to the size of the college. 133 Thus, there was no compulsion to rely
on faculty for advice or policy establishment and implementation. In
essence, Loretto Heights' faculty was not aligned with management be-
cause management did not need them to be.
Even more significant than the numbers themselves is the fact that
among their number, Loretto Heights management had Program Direc-
tors who were found to form a very effective buffer between top man-
agement and faculty. 134 These Program Directors are part of the
administration but also teach courses as members of the faculty.' 3 5 Be-
cause they are so much like members of the faculty, the Tenth Circuit
found they "possess the 'professional expertise' that the [Yeshiva] Court
deemed 'indispensable' to the formulation and implementation of aca-
demic policy."1
3 6
130. 742 F.2d at 1254.
131. When the Second Circuit reviewed the record in Yeshiva, there were approxi-
mately 2,500 full and part-time students. The University was staffed by 209 full-time and
150 part-time faculty members. The Court does not break down the number of adminis-
trators but recites a number of them and makes references to deans and directors. Yeshiva
v. NLRB et al., 582 F.2d at 690. It would seem that there was some layer of administration
between the faculty and the President, undercutting the General Counsel's theory of
Yeshiva's compulsion to allow its faculty members to manage.
132. 742 F.2d at 1254. This theory of "compulsion" does not have its source in any
direct quote in Yeshiva. Rather, it comes to Laretto Heights by way of the General Counsel's
Memorandum (see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text) and its acceptance by the ALJ
(see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text).
133. 742 F.2d at 1254. At the time the record was made in Loretto Heights, there was "a
full-time faculty of approximately 60 to 65, and a part-time faculty of approximately 30 to
35". The administrative staff was stated to be 19 without counting the Program Directors
who were considered administrators. The student body was approximately 850. ALJ Op.,
supra note 55, at 3.
134. 742 F.2d at 1254.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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B. Analyzing Loretto Heights
Thus, the Tenth Circuit confirmed Yeshiva's message that profes-
sional expertise is necessary to the formulation of academic policy, but
extended that principle to a holding that the locus of that expertise is
critical: "The availability of this expertise within the ranks of the admin-
istration obviates the College's need to rely extensively on the profes-
sional judgment of its faculty in determining and implementing
academic policy." 
13 7
Notwithstanding the fact that the "number of administrators" test
has some inherent problems of its own (does one count all professionals
who are non-unit members, e.g., the Director of Intramural Events,
Building and Grounds Supervisors, Office of Public Information Heads,
or does one count only those administrator-managers in the academic
area?), the ratio of administrators to faculty analysis propounded by the
Board in its brief in itself misleading? 13 8 Certain administrative func-
tions are practically fixed in any college or university whether it has a
student body of 500 or 50,000. Thus, in similar institution like Loretto
Heights, their numbers seem disproportionate to the number of stu-
dents and/or faculty than they would at a larger university like Yeshiva.
But more importantly, the numerical analysis seems to miss the mark
with regard to the Yeshiva analysis. Yeshiva required faculty participa-
tion in governance not because the administration was too small but be-
cause the faculty had the "indispensable" professional expertise needed
to formulate and implement the educational policy.
The "Program Director - buffer" argument merits more serious
consideration. Program Directors wear an administrative shoe on one
foot, a faculty shoe on the other. They administer their respective disci-
pline areas and represent that discipline both to the Academic Dean and
to faculty governance committees. For these functions, they have re-
duced teaching loads. Otherwise, they are like faculty members in that
they teach, serve on faculty governance committees, and have faculty
voting rights. The Board argued that their reduced teaching load ren-
dered them "the only persons who have the time and the authority to
run the department on a day-to-day basis". 13 9 This may be true, but it
should not be dispositive as to the status of the other faculty members.
The program director/department chairman question has been a
continuously perplexing one in higher education labor cases.
140
Neither the Board, nor apparently the Court, appreciates the distinction
between an academic-line organization (which provides vertical coordi-
nation through the dean, program director/department chairman, and
faculty members in a specific discipline) and a governance organization
(which cuts across discipline lines and reports sometimes to the Aca-
137. Id.
138. Respondent's Brief, supra note 117, at 28.
139. Id. at 30.
140. See the discussion in Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1980).
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demic Dean, but just as often to the President of the College or the Dean
of Student Life, depending on the subject matter involved).
In the academic-line organization, the director/chairman functions
administratively both as a spokesman for his discipline and as an in-
dependent voter. However, in faculty governance, the direc-
tor/chairman serves as any other faculty member. It is not unusual for
an academic-line organization director/chairman, however appointed,
to simultaneously hold positions on, or even chair, faculty governance
committees to which they were elected by the faculty. This does not
necessarily dilute the power of the governance committee; rather it
could just as easily be viewed as an alignment of interests between
faculty and institution. In the former view, it would produce non-mana-
gerial employees; in the latter view, it would produce Yeshiva-like
employees. 14'
While the presence of Program Directors may indicate that they are
the only ones with the time to run the day-to-day affairs of the discipline
area, it is not indicative of any other faculty member's lack of participa-
tion in college governance. In adopting both the Board's "numbers ra-
tionale" and "program director-buffer rationale", the Tenth Circuit
further institutionalized an apparent judicial misunderstanding of
academia and made faculty managerial status more dependent than ever
on managerial needs.
Perhaps a more cogent measure of managerial status would be to
determine in what areas the control of the faculty is found. Had the
Tenth Circuit articulated a threshold criterion for determining whether
a university is "like Yeshiva", depending on whether its faculty exercises
absolute control over academic affairs, it would have been consistent
with the Yeshia holding and would have gone some distance to clarify
managerial status. Absolute control in academic affairs is consistent
with the Supreme Court's articulation of independent judgment exer-
cised by teaching professionals as vital to an institution being "like
Yeshiva".
In Yeshiva, the university conceded the professional academic status
of its faculty. The fact that the faculty exercised control extending to the
whole operation was the managerial determinant. Instead of courting
administrators and culling their resumes for evidence of faculty-like pro-
fessional expertise, the Board and the courts should delineate three
levels of faculty status under the NLRA: (1) faculty as employees - those
who do not exercise control over academic affairs; (2) faculty as profes-
sionals - those who do exercise absolute control over academic affairs;
and (3) faculty as managers - those who exercise absolute control over
academic affairs and effectively determine policy and resource allocation
throughout the university so as to substantially and pervasively operate
the enterprise. While exercise of academic judgment may be consonant
141. See 444 U.S. at 688. There the Court specifically finds unjustified the Board's as-
sumption that a faculty's interests and those of the institution cannot be simultaneously
aligned.
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with management policy, such exercise does not necessarily effectuate
that policy. The effectuation, and thus the managerial status, comes
only when the faculty has at least effective recommendation authority as
to the allocation of the institution's resources.
Under such a delineation, Loretto Heights faculty would still be
non-managerial. The ALJ found that Loretto Heights faculty members
had not participated in any budget preparation or decisions beyond cler-
ical tasks. 14 2 With its opinion the Tenth Circuit could have taken the
opportunity to point out that even if the faculty did meet the threshold
criterion of absolute control over academic affairs, its lack of responsibil-
ity and authority in controlling the financial resources used to effectuate
management policy rendered them non-managerial. Therefore, the
Loretto Heights faculty was unlike the faculty at Yeshiva.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Loretto Heights, the Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to provide
much needed clarification to the Supreme Court's Yeshiva ruling. That
opportunity was largely bypassed. Out of its decision, a new test may
have arisen, the "effective buffer test", which is but a perpetuation of the
General Counsel's misreading of Yeshiva. The endorsement of such a
test unnecessarily complicates administrative and judicial attempts at
dealing with Yeshiva and will most probably have a disparate impact on
smaller institutions.
John J. Krause
142. ALJ OP., supra note 55, at 7.
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